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Unlike other industries in which intellectual property is patentable, the finan-
cial industry relies on trade secrecy to protect its business processes and meth-
ods, which can obscure critical financial risk exposures from regulators and
the public. We develop methods for sharing and aggregating such risk expo-
sures that protect the privacy of all parties involved and without the need for
a trusted third party. Our approach employs secure multi-party computation
techniques from cryptography in which multiple parties are able to compute
joint functions without revealing their individual inputs. In our framework,
individual financial institutions evaluate a protocol on their proprietary data
which cannot be inverted, leading to secure computations of real-valued statis-
tics such a concentration indexes, pairwise correlations, and other single- and
multi-point statistics. The proposed protocols are computationally tractable
on realistic sample sizes. Potential financial applications include: the con-
struction of privacy-preserving real-time indexes of bank capital and leverage
ratios; the monitoring of delegated portfolio investments; financial audits; and
the publication of new indexes of proprietary trading strategies.
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Introduction
While there is still considerable controversy over the root causes of the Financial Crisis of 2007–
2009, there is little dispute that regulators, policymakers, and the financial industry did not have
ready access to information with which early warning signals could have been generated. For
example, prior to the Dodd Frank Act of 2010, even systemically important financial institu-
tions such as AIG and Lehman Brothers were not obligated to report their amount of financial
leverage, asset illiquidity, counterparty risk exposures, market share, and other critical risk data
to any regulatory agency. If aggregated over the entire financial industry, such data could have
played a critical role in providing regulators and investors with advance notice of AIG’s un-
usually concentrated position in credit default swaps, as well as the exposure of money market
funds to Lehman bonds. Of course, such information is currently considered proprietary and
highly confidential, and releasing it into the public domain would clearly disadvantage certain
companies and benefit their competitors. But without this information, regulators and investors
cannot react in a timely and measured fashion to growing threats to financial stability, thereby
assuring their realization.
At the heart of this vexing challenge is privacy. Unlike other industries in which intel-
lectual property is protected by patents, the financial industry consists primarily of “business
processes” that the U.S. Patent Office deems unpatentable, at least until recently [1]. There-
fore, trade secrecy has become the preferred method by which financial institutions protect the
vast majority of their intellectual property, hence their need to limit disclosure of their business
processes, methods, and data. Forcing a financial institution to publicly disclose its proprietary
information—and without the quid pro quo of 17-year exclusivity that a patent affords—will
obviously discourage innovation, which benefits no one. Accordingly, government policy has
tread carefully on the financial industry’s disclosure requirements.
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In this paper, we propose a new approach to financial systemic risk management and mon-
itoring via cryptographic computational methods in which the two seemingly irreconcilable
objectives of protecting trade secrets and providing the public with systemic risk transparency
can be achieved simultaneously. To accomplish these goals, we develop self-regulated pro-
tocols for securely computing aggregate risk measures. The protocols are constructed using
secure multi-party computation tools [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7], specifically using secret sharing [8]. It is
known from [6, 2] that general Boolean functions can be securely computed using “circuit eval-
uation protocols”. Since computing any function on real-valued data is approximated arbitrarily
well by computing a function on quantized (or binary) data, such an approach can theoretically
be used. However, for arbitrary functions and high precision, the resulting protocols may be
computationally too demanding and therefore impractical. We show in this paper that for com-
puting aggregate risk measures based on standard sample moments such as means, variances,
and covariances—the typical inputs for financial risk measures—simple and efficient protocols
can be achieved using secret-sharing over large finite fields or directly over the reals.
With the resulting measures, it is possible to compute the aggregate risk exposures of a group
of financial institutions—for example, a concentration (or “Herfindahl”) index of the credit
default swaps market, the aggregate leverage of the hedge-fund industry, or the margin-to-equity
ratio of all futures brokers—without jeopardizing the privacy of any individual institution. More
importantly, these measures will enable regulators and the public to accurately measure and
monitor the amount of risk in the financial system while preserving the intellectual property
and privacy of individual financial institutions.
Privacy-preserving risk measures may also facilitate the ability of the financial industry
to regulate itself more effectively. Despite the long history of “self-regulatory organizations”
(SROs) in financial services, the efficacy of self regulation has been sorely tested by the re-
cent financial crisis. However, SROs may be considerably more effective if they had access to
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timely and accurate information about systemic risk that did not place any single stakeholder at
a competitive disadvantage. Also, the broad dissemination of privacy-preserving systemic risk
measures will enable the public to respond appropriately as well, reducing general risk-taking
activity as the threat of losses looms larger due to increasing systemic exposures. Truly sustain-
able financial stability is more likely to be achieved by such self-correcting feedback loops than
by any set of regulatory measures.
Secure Protocols
Many important statistical measures such as, mean, standard deviation, concentration ratios,
pairwise correlations can be obtained by taking summations and inner products on the data.
Therefore, we present secure protocols for these two specific functions.
We start with a basic protocol to securely compute the sum of m secret numbers. This pro-
tocol result from an application of secret-sharing [8] and basic probability results. We assume
that each number belongs to a known range, which we pick to be [0, 1] for simplicity. Recall
that the operation amodulom (written a mod m) produces the unique number a+km ∈ [0,m)
where k is an integer, e.g., 3.6 mod 2 = 1.6.
Secure-Sum Protocol
For i = 1, . . . ,m, each party i possesses the secret number xi ∈ [0, 1] as an input, and the
output to each party is s =
∑m
i=1 xi (where the addition is over the reals).
The protocol is as follows:
1. Each pair of parties exchange privately random numbers. Namely, for all i, j with i 6= j,
party i provides to party j a random number Rij drawn uniformly at random in [0,m].
2. For each i, party i adds to its secret number the random numbers it has received from
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other parties and subtracts the random numbers it has provided to other parties. More
formally, party i computes Si = xi +
∑
j∈{1,...,m}
j 6=i
Rji −
∑
j∈{1,...,m}
j 6=i
Rij modm. Each
party publicly reveals Si.
3. Each party computes S =
∑m
i=1 Si modm, which equals s =
∑m
i=1 xi.
Numerical example. Let m=3 (i.e., three parties), x1 =0.1, x2 =0.2 and x3 =0.3. In the first
round of the protocol, the parties exchange random numbers Rij . For example,
Party 1 Party 2 Party 3
Party 1 provides 1.4 2.1
Party 2 provides 1.1 2.3
Party 3 provides 0.3 2.9
In the second round, party i adds to its secret number the elements of the i-th column and
subtract the elements of the i-th row (using modulo 3 arithmetic). Each party publishes the
result Si:
S1 S2 S3
1 1.1 1.5
Finally, the parties add these numbers (modulo 3) and compute the output sum:
s = 3.6 mod 3 = 0.6.
Protocol correctness and secrecy. If the parties follow the protocol correctly, it is easy to check
that the correct sum is always obtained, since each element Rij is added and subtracted once in
S. In addition, we show that this protocol reveals nothing else about the secret numbers than
their sum, even if the parties attempt to infer more from the exchanged data. For example, Party
1 may try to learn more about other parties’ secret numbers by using the information gathered
in S1, S2, S3. We state informally the secrecy guarantee in the following theorem and provide
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Figure 1: Each point in the plot is a realization of (S1, S2, S3) (step 2 in the secure-sum protocol)
for a drawing of the matrix R, keeping x1 = 0.1, x2 = 0.2 and x3 = 0.3 fixed. As illustrated by
the plot, the set of points (s1, s2, s3) for which s1 + s2 + s3 mod 3 = 0.6 is uniformly covered,
suggesting that the Si’s do not carry any other information about the xi’s than their sum.
m privately known real numbers and does not reveal any additional information about the
individual numbers.
To compute securely the inner-product of two real vectors, a slightly more sophisticated
protocol is developed, using secret-sharing (6), as employed in the protocols of (2, 3). The
obtained protocol, named secure-inner-product, is described in details in the appendix. We
state here the security guarantee.
Theorem 2. The secure-inner-product protocol is a self-regulated protocol which outputs the
inner-product of two privately own real vectors and does not reveal any additional information
about the individual vectors.
Previous theorems hold provided that the parties follow the protocol requirements. Exten-
sions to malicious parties or other type of functions can be considered but are not discussed
here.
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Figure 1: Each point in the plot is a realization of (S1, S2, S3) (step 2 in the Secure-Sum proto-
col) for a drawing of th matrix R, keeping x1 = 0.1, x2 =0.2 and x3 =0.3 fix . As illustrated
by the plot, the set of points (s1, s2, s3) for which s1+s2+s3 mod 3 = 0.6 is uniformly covered,
suggesting that the Si’s do not carry any other information about the xi’s than their sum.
a formal statement and proof in the appendix. We first illustrate a weaker fact here by plotting
the values of S1, S2, S3 for several realizations of the random numbers Rij , while keeping fixed
x1 =0.1, x2 =0.2 and x3 =0.3. As shown in Figure 1, the realizations of (S1, S2, S3) uniformly
cover the set of points (s1, s2, s3) for which s1+ 2+s3 mod 3 = 0.6, suggesting that there is no
relevant information in the Si’s other than their sum.
The following is obtained assuming that parties follow the protocol requirements without
deviating from it.
Theorem 1. The Secure-Sum protocol outputs the sum of m privately owned real numbers and
does not reveal any additional information about the individual numbers.
This theorem follows directly from secret-sharing [8] and basic probability results. For
convenience, we provide a proof in the Appendix.
Secure-Inner-Product Protocol
To compute securely the inner product of two real vectors, slightly more sophisticated protocols
are developed and presented in the appendix, using basic secret sharing [8], secret-sharing as
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employed in [7, 3, 4], and Oblivious Transfer [9, 10]. The variants include information-theoretic
and cryptographic protocols on quantized or real data, and have different attributes discussed in
the appendix. We state here an informal result regarding one of these protocols which we call
Secure-Inner-Product protocol 1.
Theorem 2. The Secure-Inner-Product protocol 1 outputs the sum of two privately owned quan-
tized vectors and does not reveal any additional information about the individual vectors.
Note that the previous two theorems hold provided that the parties follow the protocol require-
ments (without colluding or cheating). Extensions to malicious parties or other type of functions
can also be developed but are not discussed here.
Illustrative Example
To illustrate the practical implementation of privacy-preserving measures, we provide a simple
numerical example using publicly available quarterly data from June 1986 to December 2010
(released in arrears by the U.S. Federal Reserve) on the total amount of outstanding loans linked
to real estate issued by three major bank holding companies: Bank of America, JPMorgan, and
Wells Fargo [11]. Suppose that the aggregate value of these loans across the three banks is the
risk exposure of interest, and the magnitude of outstanding loans for each bank is the proprietary
data to be kept private. The historical time series of these data are displayed in Figure 2(a); the
bar graph in blue is the aggregate risk exposure to be computed and the three line graphs are the
proprietary inputs.
The desired result can be obtained with an application of the Secure-Sum protocol described
above [12], which consists of two steps. In the first step, each institution produces two random
numbers to be shared, one for each of the other two participating institutions. These numbers
are shown in line graphs of Figure 2(b) where the color coding indicates the institution gen-
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erating the random numbers. Since these numbers are purely random, there is no relationship
between them and the private data of Figure 2(a), a fact that is clear from visual inspection of
the intermediate outputs in Figure 2(b).
In the second step of the Secure-Sum protocol, each institution uses its private data, the
two numbers it receives from the other two participating banks, as well as the two numbers it
sends to the other two institutions to produce a single value, which we refer to as the privacy-
preserving measure of its private data. This value will be revealed to the other two institutions.
While these privacy-preserving measures, shown in Figure 2(c), seem like a pure noise, they
have just enough of the original data so that the sum of these three numbers under modulo
arithmetic yields the correct sum of the original inputs. The key here is that the randomness
produced in the first step, as shown in Figure 2(b), exactly cancels in the second step due to
the way that the protocol in constructed. It is apparent that the aggregate loans outstanding in
Figure 2(c) is identical to the corresponding graph in Figure 2(a), but the former graph has been
computed using only the privacy-preserving measures of Figure 2(c).
Despite the fact that the underlying data used in this example is not confidential, even in this
simple illustrative case privacy-preserving measures may still prove useful in providing financial
institutions and regulators with an incentive to release the data without a lag. More timely
releases would obviously benefit all stakeholders by allowing them to respond more nimbly to
changing market conditions, but such releases could also disadvantage certain parties in favor
of others if privacy were not assured. Moreover, this example underscores the simplicity with
which more sensitive data such as leverage ratios, positions in illiquid assets, and off-balance-
sheet derivatives holdings can be shared regularly, securely, and in a timely fashion.
We consider only three institutions in this example because it is the simplest non-trivial
case in which privacy-preserving measures of aggregate sums can be constructed. Clearly, the
protocol is applicable for any number of participants greater than two, and implementation for
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even several thousand participants is extremely fast. More complex risk exposures such as
Herfindahl concentration indices require two applications of the Secure-Sum protocol, but the
computational burdens are still quite modest. The Secure-Inner-Product protocol can be used
to construct multi-point statistical measures such as average correlations between changes in
securities holdings or leverage across industry participants.
Discussion
By construction, privacy-preserving measures of financial risk exposures cannot be “reverse-
engineered” to yield information about the individual constituents. Accordingly, there is no
guarantee that the individual inputs are truthful. In this respect, the potential for misreporting
and fraud are no different for these measures than they are for current reporting obligations
by financial institutions to their regulators, and existing mechanisms for ensuring compliance—
random periodic examinations and severe criminal and civil penalties for misleading disclosures—
must be applied here as well.
However, unlike traditional regulatory disclosures, privacy-preserving measures will pro-
vide its users with a strong incentive to be truthful because the mathematical guarantee of pri-
vacy eliminates the primary motivation for obfuscation. Since each institution’s proprietary
information remains private even after disclosure, dishonesty yields no discernible benefits but
could have tremendous reputational costs, and this asymmetric payoff provides significantly
greater economic incentive for compliance. Moreover, accurate and timely measures of system-
wide risk exposures can benefit the entire industry in allowing institutions and investors to en-
gage in self-correcting behavior that can reduce the likelihood of systemic shocks. For example,
if all stakeholders were able to monitor the aggregate amount of leverage in the financial system
at all times, there is a greater chance that market participants would become more wary and less
aggressive as they observe leverage rising beyond prudent levels.
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Figure 2: An illustration of a privacy-preserving measure of the aggregate amount of real-estate-
linked loans outstanding for Bank of America, JPMorgan, and Wells Fargo from June 1986 to
December 2010. Panel (a) contains the three historical quarterly time series of outstanding
outstanding loans which is private and the aggregate sum which we wish to compute securely.
Panel (b) contains the six time series of intermediate numbers that are exchanged bilaterally
between all pairs. Panel (c) contains the three privacy-preserving values that are shared between
all banks and used to compute the aggregate sum, which is identical to the aggregate sum in
Panel (a).
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A related issue is whether participation in privacy-preserving disclosures of financial risk
exposures is voluntary or mandated by regulation. Given the extremely low cost/benefit ratio
of such disclosures, there is reason to believe that the financial industry may well adopt such
disclosures voluntarily. A case in point is Markit, a successful industry consortium of dealers of
credit default swaps (CDS) that emerged in 2001 to pool confidential pricing data on individual
CDS transactions and make the anonymized data available to each other and the public so as
to promote transparency and liquidity in this market [13]. According to Markit’s website, the
data of its consortium members are “. . .provided on equal terms to whoever wanted to use it,
with the same data released to all customers at the same time, giving both the sell-side and
buy-side access to exactly the same daily valuation and risk management information”. From
this carefully crafted statement, it is clear that equitable and easy access to data is of paramount
importance in structuring this popular data-sharing consortium. Privacy-preserving methods of
sharing information could greatly enhance the efficacy and popularity of such cooperatives.
The same motivation applies to the sharing of aggregate financial risk exposures, but with
even greater stakes as the recent financial crisis has demonstrated. Once a privacy-preserving
system-risk-exposures consortium is established, the benefits will so clearly dominate the nom-
inal costs of participation that it should gain widespread acceptance and adoption in short order.
Indeed, participation in such a consortium may serve as a visible commitment to industry best
practices that yields tangible benefits for business development, leading to a “virtuous cycle” of
privacy-preserving risk disclosure throughout the financial industry
Conclusion
Privacy-preserving measures of financial risk exposures solve the challenge of measuring ag-
gregate risk among multiple financial institutions without encroaching on the privacy of any
individual institution. Previous approaches to addressing this challenge require trusted third
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parties, i.e., regulators, to collect, archive, and properly assess systemic risk. Apart from the
burden this places on government oversight, such an approach is also highly inefficient, requir-
ing properly targeted and perfectly timed regulatory intervention among an increasingly com-
plex and dynamic financial system. Privacy-preserving measures can promote more efficient
“crowdsourced” responses to emerging threats to systemic stability, enabling both regulators
and market participants to accurately monitor systemic risks in a timely and coordinated fash-
ion, creating a more responsive negative-feedback loop for stabilizing the financial system. This
feature may be especially valuable for promoting international coordination among multiple
regulatory jurisdictions. While a certain degree of regulatory competition is unavoidable given
the competitive nature of sovereign governments, privacy-preserving measures do eliminate a
significant political obstacle to regulatory collaboration across national boundaries.
Privacy-preserving risk measures have several other financial and non-financial applications.
Investors such as endowments, foundations, pension and sovereign wealth funds can use these
measures to ensure that their investments in various proprietary vehicles—hedge funds, private
equity, and other private partnerships—are sufficiently diversified and not overly concentrated in
a small number of risk factors. Financial auditors charged with the task of valuing illiquid assets
at a given financial institution can use these measures to compare and contrast their valuations
with the industry average and the dispersion of valuations across multiple institutions. Real-
time indexes of the aggregate amount of hedging activity in systemically important markets like
the S&P 500 futures contract may be constructed, which could have served as an early warning
signal for the “Flash Crash” of May 6, 2010.
More broadly, privacy-preserving measures of risk exposures may be useful in other in-
dustries in which aggregate risks are created by individual institutions and where maintaining
privacy in computing such risks is important for promoting transparency and innovation, such
as healthcare, epidemiology, and agribusiness.
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Appendix
In this appendix, we provide formal theorems and proofs of the security guarantees ensured
by the Secure-Sum and three Secure-Inner-Product protocols, assuming semi-honest parties
(possibly curious but following the protocol correctly). Extensions to malicious parties can be
considered but are not discussed here.
Secure-Inner-Product protocols 1 and 2 use a third dummy party to help with the compu-
tations while Secure-Inner-Product protocol 3 does not. The dummy party does not possess
inputs or receives meaningful information but simply helps with the computation (note that
for the applications in mind, the use of a dummy party does not represent a significant obsta-
cle). Secure-Inner-Product protocols 1 and 3 are defined on quantized data, while Secure-Inner-
Product protocol 2 applies directly to real-valued data. Finally, Secure-Inner-Product protocol
1 provides information-theoretic security, Secure-Inner-Product protocol 2 provides ‘almost’
information-theoretic security (as defined in Theorem 5) and both protocols require only ele-
mentary operations at a computational level, while Secure-Inner-Product protocol 3 provides
cryptographic security (i.e., it relies on computational-hardness assumptions) and uses OT pro-
tocols (hence non-elementary operations such as RSA [14] encryptions and decryptions).
An important benchmark for the practical consideration of secure protocols is the number of
communication rounds, which require exchange of data over communications media such as the
internet. With a standard internet connection and for arbitrary distances this can take no longer
than 2–3 seconds but may also dominate the protocol running time. All protocols proposed here
require few communication rounds. The following table summarizes these properties, where n
denotes the vector dimension and q the quantization level.
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Protocols Security Dummy party Data Rounds Complexity
Secure-Sum IT no real 2 elem. op.
Secure-Inner-Product 1 IT yes quantized 3 elem. op.
Secure-Inner-Product 2 almost IT yes real 3 elem. op.
Secure-Inner-Product 3 crypto no quantized 3 O(nq2) OT
Sum Protocols and Theorems
For convenience, we restate the Secure-Sum protocol.
Secure-Sum Protocol.
Inputs: for i = 1, . . . ,m, party i possesses the secret number xi ∈ [0, 1].
Output: each party obtains s =
∑m
i=1 xi (where the addition is over the reals).
Protocol:
1. Each pair of parties exchange privately random numbers. Namely, for all i, j with i 6= j,
party i provides to party j a random number Rij drawn uniformly at random in [0,m].
2. For each i, party i adds to its secret number the random numbers it has received from
other parties and subtract the random numbers it has provided to other parties. In formula,
party i computes Si = xi+
∑
j∈{1,...,m}
j 6=i
Rji−
∑
j∈{1,...,m}
j 6=i
Rij modm. Each party publicly
reveals Si.
3. Each party computes S =
∑m
i=1 Si modm, which equals s =
∑m
i=1 xi.
One can define other variants and extensions of this protocol, in which fewer random num-
bers are exchanged to minimize information flow, or in which more information is exchanged
to check the correctness of parties computations (one may also use virtual parties for that).
Theorem 3. Let x1, . . . , xm be m privately owned real numbers. Let i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and Viewi
denote the view of party i obtained from the Secure-Sum protocol with inputs x1, . . . , xm. The
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protocol outputs the sum s =
∑m
i=1 xi and the distribution of Viewi depends on x1, . . . , xm only
through s and xi.
We provide first the proof argument for m = 3. Assume that party 1 collects all the data it
possesses and received from other parties to try to learn something about their secret numbers.
That is, party 1 possesses its secret number x1, the numbers R12, R13, R21, R31 exchanged in
step 1, the numbers S1, S2, S3 revealed in step 2 and the output sum s (whose information is
already contained in the Si’s). From these, party 1 can subtract in S2, S3 the terms depending
on R12, R13, R21, R31 and obtain the right-hand side of
x2 + (R32 −R23) = S2 + (R21 −R12) mod 3 (1)
x3 − (R23 −R32) = S3 + (R31 −R13) mod 3 (2)
and this is all the information party 1 can gather about other parties secret numbers. Adding
these equations provides x2 + x3 = s− x1, i.e., what can be deduced from knowing the sum of
the secret numbers. To see that nothing else can be inferred from (1) or (2), note thatR32−R23 is
uniform on [0,m]. However, for any fixed number x ∈ [0, 1], if one adds to it a random number
R uniformly drawn in [0,m], the number x + R is also uniformly drawn in [0,m]. Therefore,
(1) (or (2)) does not provide any further information about x2 (or x3).
Proof of Theorem 3. All the arithmetic in this proof is modulo m. We first check that the proto-
col computes indeed the sum. We set Rii = 0 for all i, to simply notations. This is straightfor-
ward since Si = xi +
∑
j(Rji−Rij) and hence,
∑m
i=1 Si =
∑m
i=1 xi. Let View1 be the protocol
view of party 1, i.e.,
View1 = {x1, R1i, Ri1, Si, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ m}.
Party 1 can subtract the Rij’s it has access to in the Si’s, obtaining View′1 as a sufficient statistic
for View1, where
View′1 = {x1, Ii,∀i 6= 1}
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and
Ii = xi + Zi
Zi =
∑
j 6=1,i
(Rji −Rij)
Let us define Z = [Z2, . . . , Zm]t and W = [R2, . . . , Rm]t, where Ri contains all the Rji for
which j 6= i (in increasing order). Note that Z and W are a random vectors of dimension
respectively (m− 1)× 1 and m(m− 1)× 1. We then have that
Z = AW − AΠW,
where A is the (m− 1)×m(m− 1) matrix whose i-th row is filled with 0’s except at columns
[i(m− 2) + 1, (i+ 1)(m− 2)] where it is 1, and Π is a permutation matrix. Note that the rank
of A and the rank of M := A(I − Π) is m− 2, implying that Im(M) = Σm2 , where
Σm2 := {u2, . . . , um ∈ [0,m] :
m∑
i=2
ui = 0}.
Therefore, for any z, d ∈ Σm−1, there exists w such that Mw = d and
P{MW ≤ z + d} = P{M(W − w) ≤ z} = P{MW ≤ z}
where the second equality uses the fact that W and W − w are both i.i.d. uniform over [0,m].
This shows that Z = MW is uniform over Σm2 and I = [I2, . . . , Im] is uniform over
Σm2 (x2, . . . , xm) := {u2, . . . , um ∈ [0,m] :
m∑
i=2
ui =
m∑
i=2
xi}.
Therefore, the distribution of View′1, and hence of View1, depends only on
∑m
i=2 xi = s − x1
and x1. By symmetry, the analogue conclusion holds for any parties, which concludes the proof
of the theorem.
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Inner-Product Protocols and Theorems
We now present secure protocols to compute the sample correlation, or equivalently the inner
product, between two real vectors. Recall that the sample correlation of two vectors x = {xi}ti=1
and y = {yi}ti=1 is given by
ρ(x, y) =
∑t
i=1 xiyi − tx¯y¯
(t− 1)sxsy =
t∑
i=1
x˜iy˜i
where x¯ = 1
t
∑t
i=1 xi, sx = (
1
t−1
∑t
i=1(xi − x¯)2)1/2, y¯ = 1t
∑t
i=1 yi, sy = (
1
t−1
∑t
i=1(yi −
y¯)2)1/2, x˜i = 1(t−1)1/2 (xi − x¯)/sx and y˜i = 1(t−1)1/2 (yi − y¯)/sy.
Definition 1. We denote by Zq the set {0, 1, . . . , q − 1}, and by Fq the same set equipped with
the Galois field operations when q is a power of a prime. We define by Σk(x,Fq) the sets of
k-tuples in Fq which add up to x, i.e.,
Σk(x,Fq) := {(y1, . . . , yk) ∈ Fkq : y1 + · · ·+ yk mod q = x}.
We may call the yi’s to be shares of x.
Secure-Inner-Product Protocol 1.
Common inputs: q ∈ Z+ (the quantization level), n ∈ Z+ (the vector dimensions) and p a prime
larger than q2n.
Party 1 inputs: x1, . . . , xn ∈ Zq.
Party 2 inputs: y1, . . . , yn ∈ Zq.
Party 3 inputs: none.
1. For i = 1, . . . , n, party 1 splits xi in three shares xi(1), xi(2) and xi(3) uniformly drawn
in Σ3(xi,Fp) := {(a, b, c) ∈ F3p : a + b + c mod p = xi} and party 2 splits yi in three
shares yi(1), yi(2) and yi(3) uniformly drawn in Σ3(yi,Fp). Party 1 provides privately to
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party 2 the shares xi(1), xi(2) and privately to party 3 the share xi(3). Party 2 provides
privately to party 1 the shares yi(1), yi(2) and privately to party 3 the share yi(3).
2. Party 1 sets pi(1) = (xi(1)+xi(3))(yi(1)+yi(2)) mod p and ρ(1) =
∑n
i=1 pi(1) mod p,
party 2 sets pi(2) = yi(3)(xi(1) + xi(2)) + xi(2)(yi(1) + yi(2)) mod p and ρ(2) =∑n
i=1 pi(2) mod p, and party 3 sets pi(3) = xi(3)yi(3) mod p and ρ(3) =
∑n
i=1 pi(3) mod p.
For m = 1, 2, 3, party m splits ρ(m) in three shares ρ(m, 1), ρ(m, 2) and ρ(m, 3) uni-
formly drawn in Σ3(ρ(m),Fp) and reveals privately ρ(m, k) to party k, for k = 1, 2, 3.
3. For k = 1, 2, 3, party k computes R(k) =
∑3
m=1 ρ(m, k) mod p. Parties 1 and 2 ex-
change R(1) and R(2) and party 3 provides R(3) to parties 1 and 2. Parties 1 and 2
compute R(1) +R(2) +R(3) =
∑n
i=1 xiyi.
Theorem 4. Let x = [x1, . . . , xn] and y = [y1, . . . , yn] be two privately owned vectors on Fnq .
Let View1 denote the view of party 1 obtained from the Secure-Inner-Product protocol 1 with
inputs x, y. The protocol outputs the inner product ρ =
∑n
i=1 xiyi and the distribution of View1
depends on x, y only through ρ and x. The reciprocal result holds for party 2.
Proof of Theorem 4. The arithmetic is on Fp in the following. We first check that the protocol
computes indeed the inner product. For every i = 1, . . . , n, pi(1) + pi(2) + pi(3) = xiyi, hence
n∑
i=1
(pi(1) + pi(2) + pi(3)) = ρ(1) + ρ(2) + ρ(3) =
n∑
i=1
xiyi.
Moreover,
∑3
k=1 ρ(m, k) = ρ(m), hence
∑
k=1
R(k) =
∑
k=1
3∑
m=1
ρ(m, k) =
3∑
m=1
ρ(m) =
n∑
i=1
xiyi.
Let View1 be the protocol view of party 1, which is a function of
View′1 = {x, y(1), y(2), ρ(2, 1), ρ(3, 1), R(2), R(3)},
21
where y(1) contains all components yi(1) for i = 1, . . . , n and similarly for the y(2). Note that
for i = 1, . . . , n, (pi(1), pi(2), pi(3)) are independent and uniformly drawn in Σ3(pi,Fp), where
pi = xiyi. Moreover, step 2. and 3. of the protocol are equivalent to running the secure-sum-
protocol on ρ(1), ρ(2), ρ(3). Hence, from Theorem 3, for any realization of ρ(1), ρ(2), ρ(3),
the distribution of ρ(2, 1), ρ(3, 1), R(2), R(3) depends only on the sum ρ(1) + ρ(2) + ρ(3) =∑
i=1 pi and on ρ(1), where ρ(1) depends only on x and on y(1), y(2) which are independent
and uniformly distributed over Fp. Therefore, the distribution of View′1, hence View1, depends
only on
∑
i=1 pi = ρ and on x.
Secure-Inner-Product Protocol 2.
Common input: n ∈ Z+ (the vector dimensions) and τ ≥ n
Party 1 inputs: x1, . . . , xn ∈ [0, 1].
Party 2 inputs: y1, . . . , yn ∈ [0, 1].
Party 3 inputs: none.
1. For i = 1, . . . , n,
(a) party 1 splits xi in three shares by evaluating a random polynomial t 7→ Xi(t)
at (t1, t2, t3) = (1/4, 1/2, 3/4), where Xi(t) = xi + ait mod τ and where ai is
uniformly drawn in [0, τ ]. Party 1 reveals Xi(tj) to party j for j = 2, 3,
(b) party 2 splits yi in three shares Yi(tj) = yi + bitj mod τ , for j = 1, 2, 3, where bi is
uniformly drawn in [0, τ ], and reveals Yi(tj) to party j for j = 1, 3.
2. For j = 1, 2, 3,
(a) party j computes P (tj) =
∑t
i=1Xi(tj)Yi(tj) mod τ ,
(b) party j draws αj, βj independently and uniformly at random in [0, τ ] and for k =
1, 2, 3, sets Zj(tk) = αjtk + βjt2k mod τ and shares Zj(tk) with party k,
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(c) ρ(tj) = P (tj) +
∑3
k=1 Zk(tj) mod τ is made available to parties 1 and 2.
3. Party 1 and 2 compute ρ(0) by interpolating a degree 2 polynomial on ρ(tj), j = 1, 2, 3,
obtaining ρ(0) =
∑n
i=1 xiyi.
Theorem 5. Let x = [x1, . . . , xn] and y = [y1, . . . , yn] be two privately owned real vectors on
[0, 1]n, where n is fixed. Let View1 denote the view of party 1 obtained from the Secure-Inner-
Product protocol 2 (over the reals) with inputs x, y. The protocol outputs the inner product
ρ =
∑n
i=1 xiyi and the distribution of View1 can be approximated arbitrarily close (in total
variation distance and when τ increases) by a distribution depending on x, y only through ρ
and x. The reciprocal result holds for party 2.
We omit the proof of this theorem to conserve space since it does not concern the main scope
of the paper. We refer to Theorem 4 for a proof of a Secure Inner-Product protocol, which can
be used on real data via quantization.
We provide a third protocol to compute securely the inner-product function without using a
third dummy party but ensuring only cryptographic security. This protocol uses the Oblivious
Transfer (OT) protocol, developed by [9, 10], which is an important protocol for multi-party
computations as it allows to compute in particular secret shares of the product x ·y of two bits x
and y, and can then be used in the computation of more general circuit computations. The basic
OT protocol allows a sender to transfer one of potentially many bits to a receiver; however, the
sender remains oblivious as to what bit the receiver wants and the receiver remains oblivious
about any other bits than the one he has requested. In other words, the functionality in the OT
protocol takes the bits (b1, . . . , bk) as inputs for the first party and the index i for the second
party, and produces as output nothing for the first party and the bit bi requested by the second
party. Formally,
OTk1((b1, . . . , bk), i) = (λ, bi),
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where λ denotes the no information symbol. We now describe OT21.
OT21 protocol
Sender inputs: (b0, b1) ∈ {0, 1}2 and a private key (n, d).
Receiver inputs: i ∈ {0, 1} and a public key (n, e).
Algorithm:
1. The sender generates two random numbers x0, x1 and transmit them to the receiver.
2. The receiver generates a random number k, encrypts it with the public key and scrambles
the outcome with xi to produce c = (xi + ke) mod n
3. The sender decrypts the two numbers (c− x0) and (c− x1) to get k0 and k1 respectively
(i.e., it computes kj = (c − xj)d mod n for j = 0, 1). Note that either k0 or k1 is equal
to k, but these are equally likely for the sender, and reciprocally, ki⊕1 is not accessible to
the receiver. The sender then transmits a0 = b0 + k0 and a1 = b1 + k1.
4. The receiver finds bi = ai − k.
The OTk1 protocol is easily obtained by extending previous protocol to multiple sender bits, ad
similarly, one can extend the protocol to non binary fields.
We now present a cryptographic protocol for the inner product.
Secure-Inner-Product Protocol 3.
Common inputs: q (the quantization level), n (the vector dimensions).
Party 1 inputs: x1, . . . , xn ∈ Zq.
Party 2 inputs: y1, . . . , yn ∈ Zq.
1. For i = 1, . . . , n,
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(a) party 1 picks xi(2) uniformly at random in Znq2 and reveals it to party 2, who picks
yi(1) uniformly at random in Znq2 and reveals it to party 1.
(b) party 1 picks ai(1) uniformly at random in Znq2 and sends
{−ai(1),−ai(1)+xi(1),−ai(1)+2xi(1),−ai(1)+3xi(1), . . . ,−ai(1)+(nq2−1)xi(1)}
(all operations mod nq2) with OTnq
2
1 to party 2 who picks the yi(2)-th element.
(c) party 2 picks bi(2) uniformly at random in Znq2 and sends
{−bi(2),−bi(2)+xi(2),−bi(2)+2xi(2),−bi(2)+3xi(2), . . . ,−bi(2)+(tq2−1)xi(2)}
(all operations mod nq2) with OTnq
2
1 to party 1 who picks the yi(1)-th element.
(d) party 1 computes pi(1) = xi(1)yi(1) + ai(1) + bi(1) mod nq2 and party computes
pi(2) = xi(2)yi(2)+ai(2)+bi(2) mod nq
2. Note that these are shares of the product
xiyi.
2. Party 1 computes ρ(1) =
∑n
i=1 pi(1) mod nq
2 and reveals it to party 2, who computes
ρ(2) =
∑n
i=1 pi(2) mod nq
2 and reveals it to party 1.
3. Each party computes ρ(1) + ρ(2) mod nq2 =
∑n
i=1 xiyi.
From the protocol construction, we have the following result.
Lemma 1. Secure-Inner-Product protocol 3 privately reduces the correlation computation to
the OT protocol.
The notion of being “privately reducible” is formally defined in Section 2.2. of [15]. From
the composition theorem for the semi-honest setting in Section 2.2. of [15], one obtains as a
consequence of the previous lemma that Secure-Inner-Product protocol 3 privately computes
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Figure 2: Computational circuit for the secure-inner-product protocol 2.
(d) party 1 computes pi(1) = xi(1)yi(1) + ai(1) + bi(1) mod qt2 and party computes
pi(2) = xi(2)yi(2) + ai(2) + bi(2) mod qt
2. Note that these are shares of the
product xiyi.
2. Party 1 computes ρ(1) =
∑t
i=1 pi(1) mod qt
2 and reveals it to party 2, who computes
ρ(1) =
∑t
i=1 pi(1) mod qt
2 and reveals it to party 1.
3. Each party computes ρ(1) + ρ(2) mod qt2, obtaining the correlation.
This protocol requires O(tq2) OT protocols. This means a possibly high number of pub-
lic and private encryptions/decryptions (e.g., with RSA). One can use (9) to improve the OT
protocols running time.
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Figure 3: Computational circuit for the inner product
∑8
i=1 xiyi, when the inputs are k-bit
numbers.
the inner product provided the existence of trapdoor one-way permutations. In particular, using
RSA for the encryptions in OT, the protocol is secure provided that RSA cannot be broken.
This protocol requires O(nq2) OT protocols but only three communication rounds. This
still means a possibly high number of public and private encryptions/decryptions (e.g., with
RSA). One may use [16] to improve the OT protocols running time. Another approach consist
in using a Boolean circuit for correlations as in Figure 3, using OT protocols to compute shares
of the multiplication gates (and simply adding shares for the XOR gates). Such an approach,
as developed in [2], or related approaches as in [6, 5], may be particularly useful for other
functions such as for the quantile function, which does not have the arithmetic structure of
the summation or inner-product functions. In particular, [6, 5] provide protocols with constant
communication rounds which may matter for practical considerations, although for real data
problems, the practicality of such algorithms need to be further investigated.
Related literature on MPCs
Theory
The problem of secure multi-party computation emerged with the work of Yao [6] in 1982,
and with the work of Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson [2] in 1987. It is shown in [6] that
any Boolean functionality can be computed without requiring an external trusted party for two
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parties, and [2] provides protocols for arbitrarily many parties. Since these papers, many have
proposed variations of MPC settings, allowing different kinds of adversarial parties, security,
and efficiency attributes. In particular, [5] introduces cryptographic protocols with bounded cir-
cuit depths (requiring finitely many communication rounds) and [7, 3, 4] develop information-
theoretic protocols. Homomorphic encryption has also been shown to provide another approach
to secure multi-party computations [17, 18], and more recently, Gentry [19] showed that fully
homomorphic encryption schemes can be constructed, allowing addition and multiplication to
be performed on encrypted data without having to decrypt it. This approach leads to MPC pro-
tocols that do not have communication rounds increasing with the circuit complexity, although
fully homomorphic encryption is still considered impractical. For certain functionality, progress
regarding practical fully homomorphic encryption have been achieved in [20] with somewhat
fully homomorphic encryptions schemes using the learning-with-errors assumption.
Applications
The main applications associated with MPCs in the literature include distributed voting [21],
private bidding and auctions [22], data mining [23], and sharing of signature [24]. MPCs have
been used for the first time in a real-world application only in 2008, when 1,200 farmers in
Denmark employed an MPC protocol in a nation-wide auction to determine the market price of
sugar-beets contracts without revealing their selling and buying prices [25]. The whole compu-
tation took about half an hour, a satisfactory time for this application. In a different context, [26]
introduces “Patient Controlled Encryption” scheme, where an electronic health record system
allowing searches to be done on encrypted data is developed.
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